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are called forth by a work of art and particularly where such artistic creation is appreciated by many individuals in common, they establish countless possibilities of personal sympathy and fellow-feeling.

HENRY WILKES WRIGHT.

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SOCIETIES

THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE WESTERN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

THE seventeenth annual meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, held at Ann Arbor, Michigan, on April 6 and 7, 1917, was characterized both by live, profitable discussion and by a prevailing spirit of good-fellowship. The morning and afternoon sessions of the first day were devoted to papers and general discussion centering about three questions formulated by the executive committee as follows: (1) In what sense does the human person possess independence of his physical organism and environment? (2) What reality has the history of the world as the physical and biological sciences present it? (3) Does any being exist that plays the part assigned to God in theistic religion? At luncheon the visiting members of the association enjoyed the hospitality of the local members; in the evening, they were the guests of the University of Michigan at an enjoyable dinner, at the conclusion of which President Hutchins responded very happily to the request that he address the gathering. At eight o'clock the association returned to Alumni Memorial Hall for the address of the President, Professor G. H. Mead, on the subject "The Instinct of Hostility." Following the address came a delightful social hour and smoker in the rooms of the Faculty Club.

Papers dealing with a considerable variety of subjects were read and discussed during the morning of the second day. At noon the business meeting was held. A special order of business relating to the names of the Philosophical Associations of the country was disposed of by the unanimous adoption of the following resolution: "That the President-elect be instructed to appoint a committee of three to state to the officials of the American Philosophical Association the regret of this association for the disposal of the report of their committee proposing a union of the Eastern and the Western Associations; to request a conference with a committee of that association to discuss further plans for the formation of a national organization; and to act as the representatives of this association in that conference." Reports were received from the Secretary and Treasurer, E. L. Schaub, indicating a membership of seventy-nine,

an expenditure during the past year of \$25.72, and a balance in the treasury of \$177.37. Officers for the coming year were elected as follows: President, H. B. Alexander; Vice-president, E. H. Hollands; Secretary and Treasurer, E. L. Schaub; additional members of the Executive Committee, R. C. Lodge, G. H. Sabine, R. W. Sellars, David Swenson. To membership there were elected: J. M. Mecklin, D. H. Parker, and W. E. Slaght. Resolutions of thanks were voted to the President, the Board of Regents, and the members of the philosophical staff of the University of Michigan. The executive committee was charged with the decision concerning the time and place of the next annual meeting and with the task of devising some fixed plan determining automatically year by year the place, or at least the region, in which the meeting of the association is to be held.

The following are abstracts of papers read at the meeting. Where titles are missing the papers dealt with one or more of the questions formulated by the executive committee.

E. H. HOLLANDS.

Idealism in this paper does not mean that the real is ideas in somebody's mind, or that the understanding makes nature; but it does mean that the ultimate truth is an exact individual union of intelligible meaning and given existence. The datum as such simply is; but for thought it is to be understood. "Things" and "ideas" are existences, but to be philosophical we must ask what they mean. Human thinking develops its concepts and meanings experimentally, in the service of purposes and ends. Hence men live in a world full of unions of matter and form, datum and meaning. But not all of the purposes of thinking are particular purposes, relevant to particular existential situations. Thought becomes free reflection, and begins to examine the categories which as yet it has merely used. The connectedness of the "real" is emphasized, and each concept and category is now to be evaluated, for the purposes of philosophy, by its adequacy in giving intelligible form to the whole of reality. We do not have the whole of reality as datum; it is because we do not that philosophy is abstract. But we do have what we may regard as a fair sample of reality, and from it we may gather its general nature. We note that when we reflect, the particular reference to a personal consciousness is put into the background, and all that is appears as a union of datum and idea, both of which are there for the reflecting mind. The inference from "degrees of reality" is added. The conclusion drawn is that the adequate conception of reality is that of an absolute self-consciousness, whose datum is itself, but itself as expressed and particularized in finite minds, as these finite minds in turn find their datum in nature as well as in other minds. Is any

essential value of theistic religion lost in such a conception of God? A common objection is that it makes God a bare abstract intellect. But thought carries feeling and will along with it through the whole process of reality. Art and religion are part of the evidence which philosophy has to consider. The "timelessness" and "moral indifference" of the absolute are also found objectionable. But time is supposed to arise within the absolute reality and to be entirely real, on its proper level. Every important religion subordinates time in some way. The difficulty about evil is the same for all theologies which do not make God finite.

The question about the independence of the human person I take to mean, How far are his acts not the results of his physical organism and environment? The answer is, Just so far as he is a finite mind, with the power of abstractive thought. He can think-feel-will one thing to the exclusion of others, and act accordingly. If the independence means separability of the essential person from organism and environment, we must say that here as elsewhere the spatial and temporal dissolves and recedes indefinitely when analysis attacks it.

There is no sense in asking, in such reductions of the physical world, when we get to the real. If a choice has to be made, the idealist will say that the sensible world is the real world, refuse to allow any distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and call the hypothetical entities and ascertained laws of natural science real in so far as implied in the concrete entities of the sensible world. The history of this world, as given by the physical and biological sciences, he will regard as real. Why not? Idealism, rightly taken, does not require mental presentation for reality; it requires meaning for mind rather than existence in mind. And this the history in question has, since it is cognizable by mind and eventuates in mind. It has been said that such a view excludes all real novelty in this history; everything is implicit in what goes before. Just the contrary is the case; everything is implicit in the whole, and for just that reason novelty in the temporal process is possible. But no speculative philosopher who knows his business will attempt to deduce external reality from thought, the datum from the idea.

R. W. SELLARS.

The form of realism represented is critical realism. It is the aim of critical realism to get to a more adequate view of knowledge than that suggested by natural realism. Its main epistemological principles are four in number: (1) Mental pluralism. (2) That the significant distinctions used in philosophy arise within each individual's consciousness. (3) That the sense-organs are the windows of the mind. (4) That knowledge consists of cognitive ideas built up within experience and is non-apprehensional.

These epistemological principles brought to bear upon the results of contemporary science lead to certain metaphysical conclusions. I shall emphasize five of these: (1) The knowledge of the physical world (reality) gained by the physical sciences does not conflict with the acceptance of consciousness as a part of the nature of the physical world. (2) There are levels of causality in nature which we seem forced to connect with an evolutionary process involving something of the nature of creative synthesis. (3) Mind is a term which observational psychology (objective psychology, behaviorism, animal, or comparative psychology) connects with types of behavior and their internal control. (4) This knowledge of the capacities of the individual necessary to account for the type of behavior is valid knowledge of the organism. Thus the mind is not a separate thing. But (5) consciousness is also referable to the nervous system and we can therefore bring nervous system, mind, and consciousness together into one unity.

If these conclusions are tenable, the mind-body problem is a product of an inadequate epistemology and an unevolutionary view of nature. The human person is inseparable from his organism; nay more, is one with his organism.

Pragmatism and Immortality: A. W. MOORE.

The beginning of the pragmatic movement witnessed the paradox of apologetics based on pragmatism, some of whose representatives had characterized other philosophies as disingenuous apologetics. The paradox was due, first, to the desperate situation of apologetics. Kant had destroyed immortality as a logical postulate and the Hegelians had demolished it as an ethical postulate. But this destruction was not a matter of mere dialectic. The dialectic was an expression of the fact that the new demands of logical, *i. e.*, scientific, and ethical, *i. e.*, social problems could no longer tolerate the limitations which it was necessary to place on the formulation of the problems of science and society in order that they should require the postulate of immortality.

In this situation apologists seized eagerly upon the rumor that pragmatism taught the subordination of truth and thought to desire. But this was based on a misconception of the pragmatic doctrine concerning both thought and desire. In relation to any particular form of desire it is the teaching of pragmatism that the business of thought is, in old-fashioned phrase, to "rationalize" it. This means the reformation and remolding of desire so that (1) intelligent steps for its realization may be taken; (2) that it shall be made to co-operate and not conflict with other forms of desire. On this basis the question is, Can the desire for immortality be "rationalized,"

or is it a dumb longing and hope which can not be organized scientifically with other desires?

Except by the psychical researchers, the problem of immortality is not taken as a genuine problem involving a genuine future, *i. e.*, a problem for whose solution we definitely set about, projecting hypotheses and attempting verifications. Speculations concerning the qualitative and quantitative limits of our bodies based on the maintenance of personal continuity through mutilations and transformations of the body do not operate as scientific hypotheses nor do they involve a disembodied existence. But this does not justify the dogma that immortality may never attain the status of a genuine problem.

Experience and the Physical World: B. H. BODE.

The experience of the individual is a temporal event, and this temporal character requires proper recognition. The difficulties involved in according such recognition have led some to explain away the experience, while others have explained away the antecedents of the experience or else have transmuted the temporal element into something else. The way out is to conceive experience as the functioning of things in the interests of adjustment. The fact that the things and qualities presented in experience involve relationship to the body is no warrant whatever for the supposition that they are not genuinely objective. There being no absolute standard for determining what things are like "in themselves," their nature must be determined with reference to the relations in which they appear. Knowledge is not a matter of copying or of static "correspondence," but consists in the function of representation by things of other situations, other possible results. Such knowledge is true in every intelligible sense of the word, and the only questions that are theoretically unanswerable from this standpoint are questions that should not be asked.

E. S. AMES.

There are various conceptions of God in theistic religion and of the part which He plays. If a particular, individual being, omniscient and omnipotent, is meant, pragmatism would not affirm or deny. Neither would it take the agnostic position. It views that question as a puzzle.

Pragmatists have not written much on the subject. James regards God as an hypothesis,—true if it works satisfactorily. He declares his faith in a finite God which is "the ideal tendency in things."

Irving King says the concept of God "is an expression of personal attitude rather than a statement of an existence of some sort."

"So far as such symbolism satisfies and helps, it represents a genuine aspect of reality." "A god is always a reflection of the character of his worshippers."

Reality includes the reflective, idealizing activity of human experience. Creative intelligence is manifest in science and in social organization and in the progressive reconstruction of society. The individual feels himself borne up and stimulated by the social order, which exercises a kind of providence over him. He tends to take a personal attitude toward it. He uses personal symbols for social organizations, *e. g.*, colleges, cities, nations; for nature and life; and for the whole of reality in certain intimate and vital experiences. God, therefore, symbolizes existent reality especially in its social, ideal aspects.

A Realist's Past: G. D. WALCOTT.

Attention is directed to the many disagreements among scientists themselves so that no single, authoritative view of the world may be insisted upon. There are, however, several agreements, as in general method, the actuality of the external world, and the principle of the uniformity of nature.

In view of the general situation, the first point offered emphasizes the reality, or better, the actuality of any mental construct, considered as consciousness, directed toward the world as it is at present. Few of such constructs, however, are perfect, and if that be true of our mental attitude toward the world to-day, why should we expect perfect constructs with reference to the past? A fairly close approximation, based upon the best evidence obtainable, is all that we may legitimately demand.

The discussion, also, naturally calls for some statement of position with reference to time. This concept, following Newton, may best be regarded as fundamentally a duration. We have, however, our general tendency to measure that duration, and immediately we are involved in a consideration of the logical present and the specious present. If, however, we enlarge that specious present, we can think of the entire life of our solar system as a present. The subordinate divisions ordinarily made are for convenience, and frequently are determined by our myopia. The larger view suggests a something continuing for a long period of time, of which the different stages, as pictured by the scientific imagination, are simply aspects. There is a persisting core which we must recognize as well as the continually changing superficial aspects.

In closing, reference is made to an article by Royce in *Science* of three years ago. Here emphasis is laid upon a statistical interpretation of the world in place of the older, more rigid mathematical inter-

pretation. If this were followed out in detail, a looser, freer attitude toward the past, as well as toward the present, would prevail. This is approved as a substitute for the more precise demand of the absolutist. The realist has little trouble with his conception of the past. The absolutist, also, would have less trouble, if he would take this hint from Royce.

Lower Sensation Complexes and Reality: EDWIN D. STARBUCK.

Reality is in terms of value, and value lurks in the lower sensation complexes, or in the higher, in so far as the higher are surcharged with meaning derived from the lower.

The division of the senses into higher and lower cuts across most of the senses. By the higher senses one should mean all of them—chiefly sight, hearing, touch and kinesthesia—in so far as they furnish discrete and spatial qualities of experience. They should be designated the spatial or relational senses. The lower senses are those that report objects in terms of immediacy. They should be called the intimate senses.

The higher and lower sensations taken together are the universally conditioning factors of mentality. There is nothing in the mind that was not in the senses.

In art and religion the human interests in which reality is most meaningful, the intimate senses operate at the expense of the relational. The artist is great, other things being equal, in proportion to his success in appealing to touch, taste, smell, temperature, organic, and kinesthetic sensation experiences. Instances are Shakespeare, Tagore, Rodin, Jesus, the consummate moral artist, and William James, the supreme artist in portraying the facts of the mental life.

Dr. E. L. Mudge has shown empirically that from childhood to maturity the relational senses play a less and less significant rôle—from 77 per cent. among children to 0 per cent. among cultivated adults.

Ontology has always been tricked into taking its point of departure from the spatial or relational senses. It has, accordingly, pictured reality as something artificially formal, logical, structural, and objective, and has been driven into quibbling over empty formulas, false distinctions, and insoluble antinomies of its own devising. By way of reaction from its barrenness those who have a passion for a meaningful reality have found two antithetical ways of escape, neither of which is a true deliverance, transcendentalism and subjectivism.

A truer point of departure for ontology, if one must choose, is the intimate senses where reality resides. True being will then be appreciated as a somewhat that is, perhaps, warm, agreeable, satisfying,

impelling, fulfilling, purposeful, tasteful, lovable, beautiful. Its values will be caught up in acts of immediate apprehension rather than confined in exact definition. Its meanings will be symbolized by the imagination more truly than can be formulated by the reason. Metaphysics will not draw less from logic and the exact sciences, but a deal more from art and religion. The outcome of its doctrine will be not unlike Baldwin's theory of "esthetic immediacy," though it may culminate in any set of values that seem most meaningful.

For such a notion of reality to seem congenial at least four reconstructions must displace an equal number of psychological distortions: (1) The intimate sense-perceptions are not subjective. They invariably report outer conditions and one's relation to them,—the cold weather, the painful object, the agreeable or desirable food. The opposite psychologically of objectivity is *intimacy*, not-subjectivity. (2) Cognition and affection are not correlates in the sense of being basal mental states and processes. The true correlates are cognitive evaluation and immediate valuation. The fundamental fact of mentality is: (the self or organism)—(experiencing and interpreting)—(external relations and objects). There are two modes of awareness of experience, the one factual and relational, the other tending to catch up the three phases of experience into one pulse of consciousness. (3) The affections are thus not "elements" of mentality. They play about and through all experiences, the cognitive and intimate alike. (4) The higher refinements of mentality do not happen exclusively through the intermediating rôle of cognition. The intimate sense experiences refine themselves directly through their entanglements, tensions, and resolutions. In the evolution of the skill of birds and fishes in migrating, in the higher expressions of the love impulse, in the enjoyment of art and the life of religion, cognition has doubtless played a relatively modest function.

The doctrine of reality here suggested mediates realism and idealism, furnishes a working basis for pragmatism and sensationalism, abhors subjectivism and transcendentalism, is reticent about absolutism and, although agnostic upon the question of monism, leans in its direction rather than towards pluralism.

The Meaning of God to the College Man: J. M. MECKLIN.

An examination of the replies of students to questionnaires submitted by the writer shows that for the rationalistic type, the idea of God is serviceable because it provides a more logical world-order; for the mystic, God satisfies the need for companionship; for the pragmatist, the theistic idea provides sympathetic moral support in the struggle for righteousness. The question of the persistence of the theistic belief is, therefore, a question as to the extent to which the

notion of a personal God will continue to satisfy the logical, social, and moral needs of men.

Training in scientific method and in philosophy tends to invalidate conventional theism since the ideas of God, the universe, and society associated with traditional theism have little or nothing in common with the world-view of the modern scientific laboratory. An interesting sidelight upon the effect of scientific training upon traditional theistic beliefs is afforded by the results of Professor Leuba's questionnaire submitted to American scientists.

The incentives to independent thinking in the university through association with men more interested in the search for truth than in the maintenance of conventional beliefs, undoubtedly influences the student—the male students to a much greater degree than the female—in rejecting traditional beliefs.

More fundamental, however, than scientific methods or the critical attitude are the slow-moving and deep-lying forces of the social order which tend to make traditional theism superfluous in the thought and life of many men and women. This is particularly true in a democracy embracing millions. The will of the majority tends to supplant the transcendental rôle once played by the theistic idea. The atmosphere of supernaturalism associated with traditional theism is antagonistic to the modern attitude which tends more and more to find the measure of values and the goal of effort in this world.

We seem at present to be in a transitional stage. The masses of men and women of the conventional religious types still find the theistic belief necessary to their thought and life; they do not trouble themselves with the scientific difficulties that arise when we try to reconcile conventional theism with evolution or other accepted scientific concepts. Neither do they feel the social ineptitude of such a belief. There are, however, an increasing number of reflective minds that have discarded the belief; they are found for the most part among highly scientifically trained members of the community. Their significance lies in the fact that they are our intellectual leaders and to their care the community has committed the training of the generation of to-morrow.

The Fear of Machines: H. B. ALEXANDER.

Ignorance, not of nature, but of human nature, is the cause of our political superstitions. Among these, two are paramount: Belief in socialized impulse or feeling, and fear of the devices of organization—machines, material and social. These two are correlative evils, due to a deformity in society. Reliance upon feeling as a guide to conduct (be it in appeals to divine right or to the *vox populi*) is a superstitious abnegation of reason in society; fear of organization, be it

political, economic, or military, is a superstitious rejection of the means of human progress, an abnegation of the instruments of reason. A sane society is one which rationally understands itself and hence understands the proper application of its tools. Consciousness of ends is the cure of social phobias, because consciousness of ends is the key to self-control, in the state as in the individual. The tendency of states (like that of individual men) is lazily to sink back into a reliance upon appetite and impulse, whence is conjured up the specter of militarism and other social boogys. In sane societies, states gifted with an alert reason and a true understanding of their own rational interests, these cease to terrify.

God, and the Knowledge of God, according to Bergson and Spinoza:
V. T. THAYER.

Spinoza's substance, as *natura naturans*, is contrasted with Bergson's *élan vital*. Spinoza means by substance, infinite power and infinite efficacy. Spinoza's relation to Descartes, his acceptance of the physical theories of Descartes, and his correspondence with Tschirnhausen, in which Spinoza expresses dissatisfaction with the conception of extension as originally a quiescent mass into which motion was injected, and in which he expresses the purpose to redefine extension, are the grounds upon which this interpretation rests. Substance is manifested to man through two attributes, infinite cognition and infinite physical agency. The individual thing as conceived by man in *natura naturata* is artificial and partial, but its nature is still that which it has in its context: to be power, to be the endeavor to persist in being.

It is maintained that Bergson has much in common with this conception. For him reality is concrete movement, an undivided creative activity. It is a continuity of becoming—the *élan vital*. The essential difference from Spinoza's *natura naturans* is the ascription of physiological characteristics to the *élan*. For Bergson, thought is the fundamental revealer. Barring this difference, the materiality and intellectuality of Bergson correspond to Spinoza's attributes of extension and thought. Further, the two philosophers agree in their description of individual things. For Bergson as well as for Spinoza, the living body is a material zone, a center of activity, that cuts out from reality objects which are partial representations only, but which thus abstracted retain their inner character unaltered.

With reference to the question, "How do we know Reality?" the paper compares the criticism which Bergson and Spinoza make of "practical knowledge." Spinoza designates this knowledge of the imagination; Bergson terms it conceptual knowledge. In the *Ethics*, Spinoza condemns the general idea on the ground that it is inade-

quate and relative. In the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Bergson rejects conceptual knowledge, for the concept generalizes at the same time that it abstracts, and thus misses reality itself. Both Bergson and Spinoza admit that this type of knowledge serves the purposes of practical life, but they both insist that philosophy must possess absolute knowledge. This is secured through intuition, or the intellectual love of God.

The remainder of the paper is an endeavor to show that Bergson's intuition and Spinoza's intellectual love of God are similar. For each practical knowledge is insufficient. Each bases intuition upon scientific knowledge, and each appeals to a mystical experience which, while based upon scientific knowledge, transcends analysis and identifies the individual with undivided flux, with the flow of an eternal, becoming reality, *élan vital* or *natura naturans*, which both call God.

"Suggestion" in the Philosophy of Locke: R. C. LODGE.

The prevalent idealistic interpretation of Locke's philosophy lays much emphasis on his use of the term "suggestion" in connection with certain ideas such as unity, existence, infinity, *etc.* A more thoroughgoing study of Locke's language, however, shows that the term is used both more widely and more narrowly than is consistent with this interpretation, and that in fact it appears to be a fairly rare and purely stylistic variant for terms of merely empirical signification.

Anger, Resentment, and Retribution: ELLSWORTH FARIS.

The doctrine of retribution as a theory of punishment has changed front. Formerly it was theological and metaphysical, relying on the vindication of abstract justice or abstract moral law. At the present time it is a psychological argument on which the theory depends. The instinct of anger leads to a feeling of resentment, which calls for the retributive inflicting of pain on any one who has committed an offense. The argument is that to ignore this fact is to fly in the face of human nature and that, therefore, punishment can not be merely reformatory or merely social and remedial in character so long as the moral ideas and sentiments of our people remain as they are.

This modern form of the theory neglects the fact that resentment is a social manifestation and is never abstract, but always concrete and relative to the social relations of the one who judges and the one who is judged. The social relation of the one who is injured also enters in. A given act done by my enemy, my friend, and a stranger, is not one act, but three, and calls out a different reaction in each case. Moreover, there is a further complication in the matter of the one to whom the injury is done. If my friend injures my friend, if

my friend injures my enemy, if my enemy injures my friend, or my enemy harms my enemy, and so on, there will be a different complication in each case; and a different reaction.

If, therefore, the offender be considered a real member of society and the attention be focused on the best method of restoring him to complete and beneficial membership in the group, the instinct of resentment would be very little in evidence.

There is, therefore, a *moral factor of safety* which is a function of the social relations of the three parties to the situation, and the reaction is different with respect to this factor.

The real psychological fact which this erroneous formulation is trying to meet is the restlessness and uneasiness that is normally felt when the matter does not receive any attention. Our instinct of resentment (?) is almost as well satisfied if the murderer is released after a trial especially if we are sure the trial has been "fair," as if he is punished.

Anger and fear, interacting, have generated cruelty which, becoming deliberate, is habitual, then a custom. Such customs are largely the antecedents of our punishments, which have run through a development as ordeal, torture, great severity, and gradual amelioration. In an integrated society, a rational method of dealing with criminals would encounter no opposing instinct on account of the factor of safety.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Bergson and Religion. LUCIUS HOPKINS MILLER. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1916. Pp. ix + 286.

Mr. Miller writes from the standpoint of the student of religion. His aim is to "determine what would be the religious result of a complete acceptance of the Bergsonian philosophy and thus determine whether, and how far, this philosophy is compatible with religion, and especially with the Christian religion" (p. 26). He believes that religion and philosophy can not ignore one another. While religious experience is a fact of human history, "the grist of religion must be put through the mill of philosophy that man may secure a product of the very highest value, with the chaff of ignorance and of illusion winnowed away" (p. 23).

Mr. Miller's method is to present first, without any criticism, what he calls the "outstanding emphases" of Bergson's position. He does this very largely by means of well-chosen quotations from the